


# Secure Path Verification

using mobility-differentiated time of arrival



## Problem


- Imagine a car, train, plane, ship, ... moving along a **path** and reporting its **location** periodically  
⇒ path claim := sequence of location claims
- E.g. traffic management and collision avoidance rely on this information
- Claiming fake paths could have life-threatening consequences

**How to verify that a mobile node really moves along the claimed path?**

- Existing location verification schemes require specialized protocols, tight time synchronization, or special-purpose hardware

## Idea

- Mobility is not a challenge, it's a feature!



- Inter-arrival time  $\Delta_{i,j}'$  differs from inter-transmission time  $\Delta_{i,j}$  by the change in propagation delay
- Principle:** Verifiers at different positions check this condition:

$$\Delta_{i,j}' \stackrel{?}{=} \Delta_{i,j} + (\Delta_j' - \Delta_i')$$

## Results

### Benefits


- No time synchronization needed
- No extra communication needed

### Security

- Attacker: stationary, omni-directional antenna, knows everything
- Single verifier can be tricked easily by adjusting the transmission times
- Increasing number of verifiers reduces attacker's degree of freedom quickly and significantly
- Attacker can only claim positions where the differences in propagation delays to each verifier don't change ⇒ only holds for intersections of pairwise hyperbolas  $H$
- There are *at most 2* intersections for three verifiers

### Illustration

- 3 verifiers located at  $p_x$ ,  $p_y$ , and  $p_z$
- Attacker falsely claims to be at  $p_1$



⇒ there is no position left which could be undetectably spoofed by the attacker ✓

### Practical Considerations

- We face measurement errors and clock drifts in practice
- Consider likelihood instead of Boolean decision variables